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marijuana laws, and we suggested 
means of interpreting relevant criminal 
law provisions and rules of profes-
sional conduct to achieve this result.
This article builds on that analy-
sis, taking on the particular issue of 
the public lawyer’s’ role in marijuana 
regulation. For government lawyers, 
the key issues in exercising discre-
tion in the context of marijuana are not 
clients’ access to the law and equal-
ity but rather determining the clients’ 
wishes and serving them diligently 
and ethically. Lawyers representing 
state agencies, legislatures and the 
executive branch of government draft 
and interpret the rules and regula-
tions regarding marijuana. Lawyers for 
federal, state and local governments 
then interpret those rules to determine 
Although 23 states and the Dis-trict of Columbia have now legalized marijuana for med-
ical purposes, marijuana remains 
a prohibited substance under fed-
eral law. Even in Washington and 
Colorado, which have “legalized” 
marijuana use by adults, all mari-
juana conduct remains every bit as 
illegal as it does in other states — at 
least as far as the federal government 
is concerned. Because the production, 
sale, possession and use of mari-
juana remain illegal, there is a risk of 
prosecution under federal laws. Fur-
thermore, those who help marijuana 
users and providers put themselves 
at risk — federal law punishes not 
only those who violate drug laws but 
also those who assist or conspire with 
them to do so. In the case of lawyers 
representing marijuana users and busi-
nesspeople, this means not only the 
real (though remote) risk of criminal 
prosecution but also the more immedi-
ate risk of professional discipline.
In 2013, we wrote about the difficult 
place in which lawyers find them-
selves when representing marijuana 
clients.1 We argued previously that 
while both the criminal law and the 
rules of professional conduct rightly 
require legal obedience from law-
yers, other countervailing pressures 
must be considered when evaluating 
lawyers’ representation of marijuana 
clients. In particular, we argued that 
considerations of equity and access 
to justice weigh dispositively in favor 
of protecting lawyers who endeavor 
to help their clients comply with state 
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the obligations and responsibilities 
of those they represent and to help 
their clients meet those obligations 
and carry out their required tasks. 
Both state and federal prosecutors are 
charged with determining what con-
duct remains illegal under the new 
rules and, perhaps more importantly, 
with exercising discretion regarding 
whom to prosecute and to what extent.
Today’s State of Marijuana 
Law and Rules of Professional 
Conduct2
Any conversation about the legal sta-
tus of marijuana must reiterate that 
marijuana is not “legal” anywhere in 
the United States. While an ever-grow-
ing number of states have curtailed, 
amended or otherwise weakened their 
own marijuana prohibitions, the fed-
eral government has not. Marijuana 
remains a Schedule I narcotic, a drug 
whose manufacture, distribution and 
possession remain serious felonies 
punishable by long terms of impris-
onment. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
upheld the power of the federal gov-
ernment to regulate marijuana3 and 
has held that compliance with state 
law is not a defense in a prosecution 
under federal criminal provisions.4
For private lawyers representing 
clients in the marijuana industry, this 
means exposure to criminal liability 
for aiding and abetting their clients’ 
marijuana conduct and discipline 
for counseling or assisting that con-
duct. We have proposed that both of 
these concerns ought to be addressed 
in favor of permitting attorney advice 
regarding marijuana conduct in 
order to ensure clients’ access to law, 
lawyers and legal advice. Our pro-
posed approach seems to have been 
embraced. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no lawyer has been prosecuted 
for aiding and abetting a client’s mari-
juana activity except in circumstances 
where lawyers were alleged to have 
formed an intent to assist clients above 
and beyond simply representing them 
qua lawyers. And we are aware of no 
attempt by a state ethics board to dis-
cipline lawyers for assisting clients’ 
marijuana activity. 
Indeed, some jurisdictions have 
revised their rules of professional 
conduct to explicitly allow lawyers 
to represent clients in the marijuana 
industry.5 In Colorado, for example, 
Rule 1.2(d) continues to state that “[a] 
lawyer shall not counsel a client to 
engage, or assist a client, in conduct 
that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent. ...”6 However, after much 
debate, the Colorado Supreme Court 
added Comment 14 to Rule 1.2, which 
states that a lawyer may assist a client 
in conduct that the lawyer reason-
ably believes is permitted by the state’s 
marijuana laws.7 While our approach 
— construing the term assist in Rule 
1.2(d) to require a true intent — was 
not adopted by the court, the same 
result is ultimately achieved. Either 
approach gives clients greater access to 
lawyers and legal advice while putting 
to rest lawyers’ fear of discipline for 
giving that advice.
As civil servants, many have likely 
taken an oath to uphold the laws and 
Constitution of the United States as 
well as those of their own jurisdiction. 
Thus, if they play a role in facilitating 
marijuana use — either by regulating 
it, collecting the tax revenues from it, 
or helping create rules to govern the 
(still illegal) manufacture and sale of 
it — they may find their professional 
role in conflict with their oath. 
The Role of Public Lawyers 
in Marijuana Regulation and 
Decriminalization
Our approach to the regulation of 
private lawyers — permitting the 
representation of marijuana clients 
seeking to conform to state law as long 
as the lawyer does not form the intent 
to assist in a client’s criminal activity 
— applies to public lawyers as well. 
Public lawyers will rarely, if ever, 
be perceived as having the intent to 
encourage criminal conduct on the 
part of their clients. Unlike private 
lawyers who choose to take on mari-
juana practitioners and users as clients, 
the public lawyer generally does not 
choose clients or the issues they raise. 
If the regulation of marijuana becomes 
one of the topics assigned to public 
lawyers, they must simply add that 
expertise to their portfolio. Relatedly, 
public lawyers’ well-being does not 
rise and fall on the financial success of 
their clients. As a result, public law-
yers are rightly perceived as having 
goals independent of those whom they 
represent.
Perhaps more fundamentally, it is 
rarely true that the government law-
yer’s client is violating federal law, 
even if the client is involved in one 
way or another in the regulation of 
a legal marijuana market. To see this 
more clearly, consider an actual law-
suit brought on behalf of the city of 
Garden Grove in California.8 A law 
enforcement official had wrongly con-
fiscated medical marijuana belonging 
to Felix Kha and was ordered by the 
trial court to return Kha’s medicine to 
him. The city sued to enjoin the order, 
arguing that doing so would make 
the officer and the city complicit in the 
distribution of a controlled substance 
and in aiding and abetting Kha’s 
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possession of that substance. The Cali-
fornia courts rejected this contention, 
noting that the city could not be seen 
as possessing the requisite intent to 
violate federal law:
To be liable as an aider and 
abettor, a defendant must not 
only know of the unlawful pur-
pose of the perpetrator, he must 
also have the specific intent to 
commit, encourage or facili-
tate the commission of the 
offense. Stated differently, the 
defendant must associate himself 
with the venture and partici-
pate in it as in something that he 
wishes to bring about and seek 
by his actions to make it suc-
ceed. Even though Kha would 
be in violation of federal law by 
possessing marijuana, it is rather 
obvious the City has no inten-
tion to facilitate such a breach. Its 
challenge to the superior courts 
[sic] order is clear proof of that, 
and in future cases the existence 
of case law compelling it will 
resolve this issue.9 
Here, the court was writing about 
the culpability of lay employees; but 
for the lawyer working on behalf of a 
public entity, the case is more starkly 
clear. The public entity that the law-
yer represents is not seeking to aid and 
abet the use of marijuana by those that 
it regulates, and the lawyer who helps 
the state achieve its goals is a further 
step removed from such intent.
Furthermore, while many of the 
access to justice and fairness con-
cerns that motivate our conclusion 
with regard to private lawyers do not 
apply when considering the conduct 
of public lawyers, it would certainly 
be perverse to allow private marijuana 
parties to be represented by counsel 
but to deny the government that ben-
efit. Complex regulatory apparatuses 
require the participation of attorneys 
not merely on the side of the regu-
lated but on the side of the regulator as 
well. In this sense, the interest in equal 
access to justice also argues in favor of 
permitting public lawyers to engage in 
this representation.
How Public Lawyers Can 
Represent their Clients 
Effectively and Ethically
While the concerns of private law-
yers center upon whether they can 
represent marijuana clients without 
violating criminal law and the rules 
of professional conduct, public law-
yering in this area primarily raises 
questions of how to represent the client 
effectively and ethically. Specifically, 
public lawyers confront two unique 
and intertwined challenges when 
compared to private lawyers: (1) deter-
mining the appropriate allocation of 
authority/communication between 
lawyer and client and (2) exercising 
professional judgment. 
Private lawyers representing clients 
in the marijuana industry know or can 
easily ascertain their clients’ objectives. 
A typical client might, for example, 
seek a lawyer’s help in obtaining a 
license to own and operate a dispen-
sary. And if questions arise during the 
representation — regarding the cost 
of the license, disclosures that would 
have to be made to the government 
agency in order to obtain the license, 
other business interests that might be 
jeopardized by licensure, etc. — the 
lawyer can usually consult with the 
client and obtain guidance regarding 
how to proceed. 
In contrast, government lawyers 
engaged in marijuana regulation 
sometimes find themselves in a 
challenging situation in which the 
objectives of the client are unclear and 
ascertaining them may not be possible. 
A few examples illustrate the point.
Issue: Enforcement and Changing 
Public Opinion
Consider a state attorney general (AG) 
deciding whether to enforce the state’s 
criminal laws in a jurisdiction that has 
not legalized medical marijuana but 
has a large underground marijuana 
industry. On the one hand, the AG has 
a duty to enforce the state’s laws as 
written, and doing so generally serves 
the interests of the people (the AG’s 
client). An AG taking such a posi-
tion would strictly enforce her state’s 
criminal laws, legitimately reason-
ing that if the people wish to amend 
their laws to legalize or decriminal-
ize marijuana, then they ought to do so 
but that until such time she will enforce 
the state’s existing laws as written. On 
the other hand, laws sometimes linger 
on the books long after the electorate 
has lost enthusiasm for them (sodomy 
laws, for example). In that case, an AG 
might legitimately exercise her pros-
ecutorial discretion and professional 
judgment and either refuse to enforce 
those laws as written or else be very 
selective about which cases to prosecute 
under such a statute. Even in states that 
have amended their marijuana laws to 
permit certain marijuana use, difficult 
questions remain regarding how liter-
ally law enforcement should enforce 
those criminal laws that remain on the 
books.10 Absent a specific statutory 
answer, how should a prosecutor react 
to changing public opinion with regard 
to marijuana-related conduct? 
Issue: Consultation with Highest 
Authority
ABA Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.13 defines and details com-
munications with an organizational 
client, including an electorate.11 It essen-
tially guides the AG to consult with 
the highest authority that is authorized 
to speak on behalf of the people — in 
most cases, the governor of the state. 
Practically speaking, however, a gov-
ernor may not wish to decide the issue 
and may leave it to the AG’s discretion. 
Furthermore, an AG seeking in good 
faith to determine the will of the peo-
ple should be mindful of the fact that 
a governor may be as concerned with 
her political fortune and appeasing her 
political constituency as she is with 
ascertaining the true will of the people. 
Moreover, even if the governor is will-
ing to offer guidance about the will of 
the people, it is sometimes appropriate 
for an AG (or any other lawyer) to not 
follow or participate in the implementa-
tion of certain policies because they are 
illegal, immoral or dangerous. Put dif-
ferently, an AG should not reflexively 
take the position that “my constitu-
ents/clients wanted work done in this 
area so I did it” without independently 
assessing the legality and morality of 
the underlying policies. 
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The role of lawyers in drafting the 
“Torture Memo” and in otherwise 
approving the wartime practices of the 
Bush administration serve as a cau-
tionary tale for a public lawyer who 
would blindly follow the requests of 
her client.12 Communication with the 
client and determining the client’s 
wishes with regard to a particular pol-
icy outcome is a necessary but not a 
sufficient requirement of public law-
yers practicing ethically in this context.
Issue: Marijuana Law Reform and 
Agency Funding
Furthermore, consider a lawyer in a 
jurisdiction that has legalized medi-
cal marijuana who represents a state 
agency that receives significant fed-
eral funding. Should the lawyer 
advise her client to proceed with 
marijuana law reform even if such 
participation may jeopardize the 
agency’s federal funding? It seems 
to us that the attorney’s obliga-
tion, at a minimum, is to inform her 
agency and the public of the possible 
negative consequences of pursuing 
marijuana law reform and to work 
diligently on behalf of her clients 
whether they determine that the pol-
icy decision is worth the risk or not. 
Of course, the question remains of 
how the attorney should go about 
informing her client of the risks and 
determining the client’s views on the 
subject.
Conclusion 
Marijuana regulation is not a niche 
area of government regulation; it will 
influence the practice of virtually every 
public lawyer in the years to come. 
Public lawyers must understand the 
changes in marijuana law and the 
implications for government clients. 
Given the pervasiveness of the mod-
ern regulatory state, the situation is no 
easier — and, in many ways, it is more 
complicated — for public lawyers than 
it is for private ones.  
To be sure, public lawyers face myr-
iad practice challenges with respect 
to marijuana law reform, and we do 
not pretend that we have resolved 
all of the issues that are sure to arise. 
The legal status of many actors is 
uncertain whenever state law permits 
conduct that is expressly forbidden 
by the federal government. We hope 
that public lawyers will be alert to the 
risks involved in participating in mari-
juana regulation so that they can think 
carefully about their obligations when 
these issues arise. n
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